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THE IMPACT OF THE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING
TRADE AGREEMENT (ACTA) ON CANADIAN
COPYRIGHT LAW1
Elizabeth F. Judge & Saleh Al-Sharieh2
ABSTRACT
With the advent of The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA),
the protection and enforceability of intellectual property rights will
continue growing. Canadians, like other citizens whose countries may
adhere to this treaty, would notice major changes to the legal systems
regulating their rights and obligations with respect to intellectual property.
With respect to copyright law, by deciding to be a party of ACTA,
Canada would be facing a true challenge of fulfilling its international
obligations and at the same time preserving its carefully drawn copyright
law and policy. This paper argues that the impact of ACTA on Canadian
copyright law would be noticeable; the proposed treaty would import into
Canadian copyright law notions that are not in harmony with its purpose,
provisions, and/or judicial interpretation. Further, the paper argues that
ACTA will be foremost in mind in the ongoing reform to the Copyright
Act; this means, if ACTA is concluded and the reform to the Canadian
Copyright Act fails, another unfulfilled international promise will be
added to the shoulder of Canadian copyright policy makers, like the one
pertinent to the WIPO Internet Treaties.

1

At the time this paper was researched and written, the July 1, 2010 draft of ACTA
was the most recent draft of the text. Any references to ―the most recent text‖ and
related analysis refer to the July 1, 2010 draft. After this paper was submitted for
publication, a new draft of ACTA was leaked on Aug. 25, 2010. This paper may be
revised by the author to reflect changes made by the Aug. 25, 2010 draft text.
2
Elizabeth F. Judge, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Common Law
Section, University of Ottawa.
Saleh AL-Sharieh, LL.D. Candidate, University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law,
Common Law Section, University of Ottawa.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Canada‘s participation in ACTA‘s negotiations has raised concerns
amongst Canadian academics, politicians, public advocacy groups, and
institutions and individuals interested in the copyright domain. Most of the
Canadian concerns share the criticism being voiced around the world on
ACTA‘s undemocratic approach toward international intellectual property
norm-setting and the prospective role of its norms in ratcheting up the
protection and enforcement of intellectual property. Nevertheless, some
concerns are specific to Canada; they are pertinent to the impact of ACTA
on the balance that is diligently struck under the Canadian Copyright Act3
and its judicial interpretation. Balance is the ultimate purpose under
Canadian copyright law, the achievement of which requires avoiding
overprotecting right holders at the expense of users, and concurrently
recognizing the latter as rights holders. Thus, since ACTA is rights-holder
oriented, many Canadians fear that the proposed treaty will reshape the
Canadian Copyright Act and, thus, distort the balance that has been struck

3

Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42. Constitutionally, Copyright falls within the
jurisdiction of the federal legislator. See s. 91(23) of Constitution Act, 1867, Department
of Justice Canada <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/const/c1867_e.html#pre>.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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in copyright protection in Canada. To alleviate these concerns, the Canadian
Industry Minister, Tony Clement, stated that ACTA will be ―subservient‖ to
Canadian legislation, including the Copyright Act. 4
This paper argues that the impact of ACTA on Canadian copyright law
would be noticeable; the proposed treaty would import into Canadian
copyright law notions that are not in harmony with the purpose of the
Canadian copyright law, the status quo of Canadian copyright law, and the
orientation of Canadian copyright jurisprudence. Further, the paper argues
that ACTA will be foremost in mind in the ongoing reform to the Copyright
Act; this means if ACTA is concluded and the reform to the Canadian
Copyright Act fails, another unfulfilled international promise will be added
to the shoulder of Canadian copyright policy makers, like the one pertinent
to WIPO internet treaties. Canada is currently engaged in Phase Three of
copyright reform, which focuses on digital copyright issues.
The
advancement of technology and the country‘s treaty obligations were the
impetus to a series of amendments to the Copyright Act, the latest of which
was in 1997. The challenges that the internet has brought to the field of
copyright by establishing the need to expand the umbrella of protection to
digital works, as evidenced by Canada being a signatory to the WIPO
internet treaties, has necessitated further amendment to the Copyright Act.
In June 2010, after two failed attempts in 2005 and 2008, the Canadian
Government tabled Bill C-32: ―An Act to amend the Copyright Act‖ to
modernize the provisions of the Copyright Act in light of the contemporary
technological advancements and, at the same time, to implement the WIPO
Internet Treaties. Despite the ongoing process to reform the Canadian
Copyright Act the Canadian Government has not been discouraged from
joining the negotiations of the proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA). Canada officially announced its intention to join the
negotiations on October 23, 2007 and has been an active participant in all
the negotiations rounds held since then.
This paper is divided into two parts: the first deals with the official
claim of ACTA as an anti-counterfeiting and piracy agreement as well as
the suspicions surrounding this claim. The second part discusses the legal
framework of ACTA and its impact on Canadian copyright law.
II.

ACTA: AN OFFICIAL CLAIM AND A SUSPICION OF A NEW BATTLE
According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative

4

Canadian Copyright Law to Trump ACTA (Dec. 1, 2009),
http://www.cbc.ca/technology/story/2009/12/01/clement-copyright-acta-ndp.html.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP

4

Impact of ACTA on Canadian Copyright Law

(USTR), the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) is a proposed
plurilateral agreement that aims to enhance the enforcement of intellectual
property rights and combat counterfeiting and piracy.5 Introducing an anticounterfeiting trade agreement was a Japanese idea, which overlapped with
the desire of other like-minded countries for stronger enforceability of
intellectual property rights as expressed in different initiatives, forums, and
events.6 Initial discussions among the United States, EU, Canada, Japan,
and Switzerland were carried out between 2006 and 2007, but the official
launch of negotiations for the ACTA was in June 2008.7 The ongoing
rounds of negotiations expanded to include more countries, such as
Australia, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, and South Korea.8
Some countries which participated in first rounds of the negotiations,
specifically Jordan, United Arab Emirates and Uruguay, have dropped out.9
So far, there have been nine rounds of negotiations and the goal of the
participating countries is to reach an agreement by the end of 2010. 10 The
tenth round of negotiations took place in Washington D.C. during the period

5

Office of the United States Trade Representative, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement - Summary of Key Elements under Discussion (Nov. 6, 2009),
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1479 [hereinafter ACTA - Summary of Key Elements].
6
See, e.g., The Second Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy:
The Lyon Declaration (Nov. 15, 2005),
http://www.ccapcongress.net/archives/Lyon/files/OutcomesStatement20051115.pdf
(considering Japan‘s proposal for a new international treaty addressing counterfeiting and
piracy); G8 Summit, Combating IPR Piracy and Counterfeiting, (St. Petersburg, Russia,
Jul. 16, 2006), http://en.g8russia.ru/docs/15.html (reaffirming the group‘s commitment to
fight piracy and counterfeiting); Office of the U.S. IPR Coordinator, Bush Administration
Strategy Targeting Organized Piracy (Sep. 2007),
http://www.stopfakes.gov/pdf/Memo_STOP_Sheet_September_2007.pdf (The ―Stop!‖
initiative was launched by the Bush administration in 2004 to harmonize the efforts of a
number of federal agencies and engage the American industry and the U.S. trading partners
in strengthening the enforcement of intellectual property rights in the U.S. and abroad);
and European Commission Directorate General for Trade, Strategy for the Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights in Third Countries (May. 5, 2005),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/april/tradoc_122636.pdf (proposing a set of
actions to overcome the problem of intellectual property violations). For a complete
account of ACTA‘s origins, see Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA,
63 SMU L. REV. 4-7 (forthcoming 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1624813.
7
See ACTA – Summary of Key Elements, supra note 5; Ambassador Schwab
Announces U.S. Will Seek New Trade Agreement to Fight Fakes (Oct. 23, 2007),
http://www.ustr.gov/ambassador-schwab-announces-us-will-seek-new-trade-agreementfight-fakes.
8
ACTA – Summary of Key Elements, supra note 5.
9
EU ACTA Negotiator Confirms EU Wants Patent Provisions in ACTA (May 8,
2009), http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/a2k/2009-May/004427.html; Charles R.
McManis, The Proposed Anti-CounterfeitingTradeAgreement (ACTA): Two Tales of a
Treaty, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1235, 1239 (2009).
10
ACTA – Summary of Key Elements, supra note 5.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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of August 16-20, 2010. In the first seven rounds of the negotiations, held
between June 2008 and January 2010, officials of participating countries
negotiated the treaty under an unprecedented veil of secrecy. 11 No official
text of the treaty was released, and the countries merely distributed a
document summarizing the major elements being discussed under the
treaty,12 and rejected the reliability of any leaked draft text of the treaty.13
Nevertheless, the US and EU denied that the negotiations are intended to be
secret, arguing that for efficiency reasons it is ―normal‖ and ―accepted
practice‖ for the early stages of international negotiations treating economic
matters not to be carried out in public and for negotiators to adhere to ―a
certain level of discretion.‖ 14
The lack of transparency in ACTA‘s negotiations has triggered severe
criticism from civil society and academics.15 At the official level, on March
11

Negotiators of ACTA agreed that all the documents exchanged in the course of the
negotiations will be classified as ―Confidential Foreign Government Information.‖ See
Office of the United States Trade Representative, Memorandum for All AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement Negotiators (Feb. 8, 2008)
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/EFF_PK_v_USTR/maruyama_decl.pdf>. Trying to get
information on ACTA‘s negotiations, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and Public
Knowledge (PK) submitted a request to the USTR, under the Freedom of Information Act,
seeking the release of records on the proposed treaty and the negotiations pertinent thereto.
The request was ignored by the USTR and, as a result, the EFF and PK initiated a suit a
against the USTR on September 17, 2008 requesting that the Court order the USTR to
respond to their request. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, FOIA: Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement (ACTA) (Sep. 17, 2008), http://www.eff.org/cases/eff-and-publicknowledge-v-ustr; Electronic Frontier Foundation and Public Knowledge v. Office of the
United States Trade Representative (Civil Action 08-1599 (D.D.C.)) (Sep. 17, 2008),
http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=0a48a9c9-adea-4d21-b1922fe34a88412b. Eventually, the EFF and PK dropped the suite on the ground that courts
have little power to force the executive branch to release documents classified confidential
on ―national security grounds,‖after the Obama‘s administration showed its support to the
classification. See EFF and Public Knowledge Reluctantly Drop Lawsuit for Information
About ACTA (Jun. 17, 2009), http://www.eff.org/press/archives/2009/06/17.
12
ACTA – Summary of Key Elements, supra note 5.
13
European Commission, Fact Sheet: Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (Oct. 23,
2007) (Updated November 2008),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/october/tradoc_140836.11.08.pdf [hereinafter
ACTA Fact Sheet].
14
Id.; see alsoACTA – Summary of Key Elements, supra note 5; see contra ―ACTA is
Secret. How Transparent are other Global Norm Setting Exercises?‖ (Jul. 21, 2009),
http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/4/attachment1_transparency_ustr.pdf.
15
See, e.g., Margot Kaminski, The Origins and Potential Impact of the AntiCounterfeitingTradeAgreement (ACTA), 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 247, 247 (2009) (describing
ACTA, due to its lack of transparency. as ―a black box that could contain a bomb‖);
Michael Geist, ACTA Guide, Part Three: Transparency and ACTA Secrecy (Jan. 27, 2010),
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4737/125/ (summarizing the public concern over
the secrecy of ACTA, identifying the sources of this secrecy, and arguing that secrecy is
not the standard in the negotiations involving international norms setting); James Love,
Transparency of FTAA Negotiations, Compared to ACTA (Dec. 7, 2009),
http://keionline.org/node/715 (arguing that it is not the standard to negotiation treaties in
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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10, 2010, the European Parliament approved a resolution calling upon the
European Commission to publicly reveal all documents pertinent to ACTA
negotiations and to promote adherence to transparency with respect to the
negotiations and their outcome.16 The European resolution and the
proliferation of leaks of ACTA documents, the most significant of which
was the January 18th treaty draft,17 motivated the negotiating countries to
release an official draft text of the treaty after the eighth round of
negotiations held in Wellington in April 2010.18 Unlike the leaked January
text, the official draft of the treaty does not identify the positions of
countries with respect to the controversial provisions; instead, each different
proposition of the participating countries was left in square brackets without
reference to the country to which this proposition belongs. In the ninth
round of negotiations held in Lucerne, Switzerland from June 28 to July 1,
2010, the participating countries did not release a new draft of the treaty;
however, a major leak of the most recent draft of the treaty shortly
followed.19
ACTA‘s claimed purpose as a treaty against piracy and counterfeiting is
surrounded by the suspicion that ACTA is merely a new battle to win the
long going war over more absolute control of intellectual property. In this

secret); Secret Counterfeiting Treaty Public Must be Made Public, Global Organizations
Say (Sep. 15, 2008), http://www.essentialaction.org/access/index.php?/archives/173Secret-Counterfeiting-Treaty-Public-Must-be-Made-Public,-Global-OrganizationsSay.html.
16
European Parliament, Resolution of 10 March 2010 on the Transparency and State
of Play of the ACTA Negotiations (Mar. 10, 2010),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-20100058+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. The European Parliament had earlier called upon the
European Commissioner to make available all the documents relating to ACTA‘s
negotiations. See Access to Documents: The European Parliament Demands more
transparency (Nov.3, 2009),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress_page/019-51409-068-03-11-90220090310IPR51408-09-03-2009-2009-false/default_es.htm.
17
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Informal Predecisional/ Deliberative Draft
(Jan. 18, 2010),
http://2974639497112273069-a-1802744773732722657-ssites.googlegroups.com/site/iipenforcement/201001_acta.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7co_45n9z
XIqlXf0Fi1a7ErxI7h3fD_hvR6UhEMRZAYGQFhDpGxubs4pGNYTZ5oQMAEuM6I0S6bQPvboErI49q2Pm19
QFB7xo7YT8a4Z8owoBYwIxNhdPAyss3Lu24Fk31aHazzcDc1L5IcaMW3oZCo4NpLjRJBvlS4XL5DzwyhWD8WAc_STH3PAPx6f98Phh8YzIZrLJtKy0Z
Rc3Yjsn5HuhcWw%3D%3D&attredirects=0 [hereinafter January Draft].
18
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Public Predecisional /Deliberative Draft
(Apr. 2010), http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1883 [hereinafter Official Draft].
19
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Informal Predecisional/ Deliberative Draft
(Jul. 1, 2010),
http://www.laquadrature.net/files/ACTA_consolidatedtext_EUrestricted130710.pdf
[hereinafter July Draft]
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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battle, industrial countries aim to achieve two goals: ratcheting up
international intellectual property protection and enforcement and, at the
same time, opposing any user-oriented force.20 This suspicion is supported
by a number of indications. Foremost, industrial countries are negotiating
ACTA as an intellectual property enforcement treaty despite their relatively
recent success concluding the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights,21 the underlying agenda of which also ratchets
up international intellectual property protection and enforceability.22
Moreover, the U.S. and EU come to ACTA negotiations after achieving a
―TRIPS-plus model‖23 of intellectual property protection and enforceability
in a bundle of bilateral and regional trade agreements they negotiated and
20

Peter M Gerhart, Why Lawmaking for Global Intellectual Property is Unbalanced,
22 EIPR 309 (2000) (arguing that the international mechanism of intellectual property
norm setting is designed to produce norms the purpose of which is mainly to serve the
interests of rights holders, regardless of the associated societal detriments to societies).
21
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal
Instruments: Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
22
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 21 at p. 21 (2004) (arguing that the TRIPS Agreement is mainly designed to serve
the interests of rights holders with little attention to the interests of users); Graeme B.
Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, International Intellectual Property Law and the
Public Domain of Science, 7(2) J.Int'l Econ.L. 431 at p. 448 (2004) ( stating ―[t]o put it
another way, because the TRIPS Agreement was negotiated with the goal of promoting
international trade, the goals of substantive balance common to domestic intellectual
property systems are barely discernible in its provisions‖); Frederick M. Abbott, The
Enduring Enigma of TRIPS: A Challenge for the World Trading System, (1998) 1(4) J.Int'l
Econ.L. 497, at p. 499 (1998) (arguing that TRIPS is a global intellectual property regime
that meets the interests of intellectual property industries in the developed world). Even
prior to introducing TRIPS Agreement, industrial countries had sought to revise
international intellectual property convention in order to expand the level and scope of
intellectual property protection and enforceability, e.g., Berne convention for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works, 9 September 1886, 1161 U.N.T.S 31, (Completed at Paris
on May 4, 1896, Revised at Berlin on November 13, 1908, completed at Berne on March
20, 1914, and revised at Rome on June 2, 1928, at Brussels on June 26, 1948, at Stockholm
on July 14, 1967, and at Paris on July 24, 1971), see Peter Burger, The Berne Convention:
Its History and Its Key Role in the Future, 3 J.L. & Tech. 3 at p.7 (1988); Ruth Okediji,
Toward an International Fair Use doctrine, 39 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 75 at pp. 104-105
(2000). ―The minimalist nature of [hereinafter Berne Convention] obfuscated the real, if yet
unrealized, triumph for high-protectionist states, namely that international copyright could
only get stronger. High-protectionist countries, such as France, incurred short-term costs in
not obtaining higher levels of protection at the Conventions' inception but, for the long
term, the fact that there was an international agreement that, by its terms, contemplated
future revisions to improve the system and make the rights more secure, was by far the
most vital victory‖.
23
For Peter Drahos, a TRIPS-Plus model ―requires a Member to implement a more
extensive standard; or [] eliminates an option for a Member under a TRIPS standard‖, see
Peter Drahos, BITS and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4(6) JWIP 791 at p.793
(2001).

WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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reached with other countries, largely developing nations.24 ACTA,
therefore, is taking the international intellectual property regime into a new
stage where the level of intellectual property protection and enforceability is
described as ―TRIPS-Plus-Plus Model.‖25 In sum, negotiating ACTA in the
presence of TRIPS‘ global ―one-size-fit all‖26 mode of protection, which is
backed by the enforceability mechanism of the WTO,27 and in the aftermath

24

See e.g., United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement between the United States of
America and the Hashemite Kingdome of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade
Area, Oct. 24, 2000, 41 I.L.M. 63 [hereinafter United States-Jordan FTA]; United StatesChile Free Trade Agreement, Jun. 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026; U.S.-Singapore Free Trade
Agreement, May., 6 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026; United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement,
Jun. 15, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 544; Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association
between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, of the other part, Nov. 24, 1997, OJ L 129 of 15.05.2002.
For a comprehensive discussion of the role bilateralism in the international intellectual
property regime, see Peter Drahos, BITS and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property,
4(6) JWIP 791, at p. 803 (describing bilateralism as a major mechanism the U.S and the
EU are utilizing to oblige developing countries to adhere to levels of intellectual property
higher than the standards required by multilateral instruments of intellectual property
protection and warning developing countries that they are being led ―into a highly complex
multilateral/bilateral web of intellectual property standards that are progressively eroding
not just their ability to set domestic standards, but also their ability to interpret their
application through domestic administrative and judicial mechanisms.‖ ); Ruth L. Okediji,
Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual Property Protection,
UOLTJ 125 (2003-2004) (arguing that bilateralism has always been a mechanism used in
regulating international relations; however, while this old bilateralism tended to confer
mutual benefits on both contracting members, the new bilateralism the United States is
adopting now in its foreign trade relations resembles a regime shifting tactic that aims at
developing an expansive intellectual property protection model free of the limitations
required by the TRIPS Agreement).
25
Susan K. Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy
Enforcement Efforts: The State of Play (Jun. 9, 2008), http://www.iqsensato.org/wpcontent/uploads/Sell_IP_Enforcement_State_of_Play-OPs_1_June_2008.pdf.
26
Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 Ind. L.J. 827 at p. 832
(2007); Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46(4)
Hous.L.R. 979 at p. 981 (2009); James Boyle, A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of
Intellectual Property, (9) Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 0009 at pp.3-4 (2004). This one-size fit-all
result was earlier warned against by PAUL A. DAVID, Intellectual Property Institutions
and the Panda's Thumb: Patents, Copyrights, and Trade Secrets in Economic Theory and
History, in GLOBAL DIMENSION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 19-61 at pp. (Mitchel B. Wallerstein, Mary Ellen
Mogee, and Roberta A. Schoen eds., 1993) (Washington, D.C., National Academy Press,
1993) (showing pessimism with respect to the practicality of establishing a uniform
international intellectual property system and predicting that the efforts to establish such a
system may result in an IP regime suitable to serve the interests and policies of one or
group of countries that are to be enforced on countries that don‘t have similar interests or
policies) at pp. 54-55.
27
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
15 1994, Marrakesh Agreement, Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S.401, 33 I.L.M. 1125
(1994) [hereinafter DSU]. The DSU has been described as the ―teeth‖ that have overcome
the enforceability difficulties that Berne Convention suffered from, see Laurence R. Helfer,
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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of spreading TRIPS-plus model of protection and enforceability, makes it
clear that ACTA is merely a further step toward more absolute control of
intellectual property.
Ratcheting up the international intellectual property protection and
enforceability through ACTA involves the same technique of regime
shifting by which industrial countries, lobbied upon by major industries,
moved international intellectual property norm settings from WIPO to the
WTO.28 Industrial countries have used regime-shifting again to produce
tougher intellectual property protection standards through a net of bilateral
and regional trade agreements. Similarly, they are moving the international
intellectual property regime to a ―club‖29 to which the number of invitations
is limited. ACTA‘s ongoing negotiations take place outside the known
forums for intellectual property protection norm setting, such as WIPO and
WTO, where a certain level of transparency, democracy and accountability
is guaranteed.30 This led some commentators to believe that ACTA‘s

Toward A Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 971,
at pp. 984-985 (2007); DANIEL GERVAIS, TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (2nd ed. 2003) at p.124.
28
Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 Yale J. Int'l L. 1, pp.14&20 (2004)
(defining regime shifting as ―an attempt to alter the status quo ante by moving treaty
negotiations, lawmaking initiatives, or standard setting activities from one international
venue to another‖, and stating the factors motivated developed countries to shift
negotiating intellectual property norms from WIPO to WTO; there factors are: ―The first
[factor] related to dissatisfaction with treaty negotiations hosted by WIPO. The second
focused on institutional features of the GATT that facilitated adoption of more stringent
intellectual property protection standards that these states favored.‖); SUSAN K.SELL,
PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS pp. 96-120 ( 2003) (discussing the consensus amongst major
industries in Japan, United States and EU on seeking an IP multilateral agreements and
their input in the TRIPS negotiations).
29
Daniel Gervais, China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforceability of
Property Rights (World Trade Organization Panel, January 26, 2009) 103 AJIL 549, at p.
555 (2009) (stating that ACTA‘s approach to international intellectual property norm
setting is a ―‗club approach‘ in which like-minded jurisdictions define enforcement
‗membership‘ rules and then invite other countries to join, presumably via other trade
agreements.‖)
30
Eddan Katz & Gwen Hinze, The Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
on the Knowledge Economy: The Accountability of the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative for the Creation of IP Enforcement Norms Through Executive Trade
Agreements, 35 YJIL Online 24 at P. 26 (2009); Robin Gross, On the Proposed AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) (Mar. 25, 2008), http://ipjustice.org/wp/wpcontent/uploads/IPJustice_ACTA-white-paper-mar2008.pdf at p.5. Many commentators
had criticized moving the intellectual property norm setting from WIPO to the WTO; this
criticism is also applicable to the issue of moving the issue of intellectual property
enforcement to ACTA, see T.N. SRINIVASAN, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM: FROM THE GATT TO THE URUGUAY
ROUND AND THE FUTURE (1998) (arguing that there was no real rational for dealing
with intellectual property issues under the trade umbrella in light of the presence of the
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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negotiations overlook the multilateral regime of IP norm setting in order to
escape ―global accountability.‖31 By avoiding WIPO and WTO as normsetting forums, ACTA escaped potential opposition from developing
countries on the governance of these organizations and the norms they
produce.32 ACTA‘s negotiations are susceptible to more criticism giving
the fact that the participating countries are mainly developed countries.
While some developing countries have been invited to the negotiations, the
major developing countries that possess a long history of negotiating
intellectual property norms and advocating for a balanced IP regime have
been left out.33 Even when the ACTA issue was raised in the G8 summits,
Russia was left out of the discussion since it does not share the same
perspective on the enforcement of intellectual property.34 The decision of
the founders of ACTA to invite certain developing countries and to exclude
others leads to three observations. First, developed countries wanted to
reach an agreement that reflects their own interests as net exporters of IP

WIPO, the organization of the most relevant expertise); Peter M. Gerhart, The Tragedy of
TRIPS, 2007 Mich. St. L. Rev. 143, at p. 183 (2007) (arguing that the WTO is not the right
forum for making intellectual property laws since no balance between rights holders and
users can be achieved there due to the differences with respect to wealth ―within countries
and between countries.‖)
31
The Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade: Agreement (ACTA): Global Policy
Implications, IQSensato's In Focus, Volume 2, Number 8 (Jun. 2, 2008) at p.7,
http://www.iqsensato.org/wp-content/uploads/InFocus%20-ACTA%20-%20Vol%202%20Issue%208.pdf.
32
Susan K. Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy
Enforcement Efforts: The State of Play (Jun. 9, 2008), http://www.iqsensato.org/wpcontent/uploads/Sell_IP_Enforcement_State_of_Play-OPs_1_June_2008.pdf.; Margot
Kaminski, The Origins and Potential Impact of the Anti-CounterfeitingTradeAgreement
(ACTA), 34 Yale J. Int'l L. 247 at p. 247 (2009) ( describing the shift of norm setting from
the WIPO and WTO as ―a form of international bullying‖).; Robin Gross, On the Proposed
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) (Mar. 25, 2008), http://ipjustice.org/wp/wpcontent/uploads/IPJustice_ACTA-white-paper-mar2008.pdf at pp. 5-6; Michael Geist,
Canada‘s ACTA Briefing, Part One: ACTA Is A Response to WIPO Gridlock (Apr.6,
2009), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/3830/99999/.
33
Robin Gross, On the Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) (Mar.
25, 2008), http://ipjustice.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/IPJustice_ACTA-white-papermar2008.pdf at p.2; Margot Kaminski, The Origins and Potential Impact of the AntiCounterfeitingTradeAgreement (ACTA), 34 Yale J. Int'l L. 247 at pp. 254-255 (2009).
Professor Michael Geist reported that Brazil expressed its wish to join ACTA‘s
negotiations to one of the negotiating countries, but Brazilian request had not received an
answer, see Michael Geist, ACTA Update: New Meetings, New Partners, New Issues (Jun.
30, 2009), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4092/408>; Ashutosh Jindal, adviser
at the Embassy of India to the EU, stated that India had not been invited to ACTA‘s
negotiations, see Intellectual Property Watch, Indian Official: ACTA Out Of Sync With
TRIPS and Public Health (May. 5, 2010) http://www.ipwatch.org/weblog/2010/05/05/indian-official-acta-out-of-sync-with-trips-and-publichealth.
34
Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 63 SMU L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2010) at p. 6, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1624813.
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based works. Secondly, at this stage, developed countries are not concerned
about the number of countries joining the negotiations, for, as in the case of
TRIPS, developed countries practically have enough mechanisms to impose
these norms on other countries when the treaty is ready, regardless of
whether or not developing countries participated in the negotiations or agree
with the outcome.35 Thirdly, by inviting specific developing countries to
the negotiations, developed countries want to clean up the outcome of the
treaty from the stigma of having been negotiated merely amongst developed
nations. Fourthly, the participating developing countries will play the role
of promoting the convention in their regions.36
In addition to regime shifting, the technique of ―framing‖ is very
noticeable in ACTA.37 In their launch to ACTA‘s negotiations, developed
countries have argued that ―counterfeit‖ and ―pirated‖ goods in international
trade have been causing rights holders economic losses, hindering the
sustainable development of both developed and developing countries, and
risking consumers‘ safety; therefore, they argue, the solution is a new
agreement embodying international cooperation toward stronger means of
intellectual property enforcement.38 This argument shares many similarities
with the reasoning that the United States and other developed countries
publicized to introduce the TRIPS Agreement;39 however, the developed

35

Margot Kaminski, The Origins and Potential Impact of the AntiCounterfeitingTradeAgreement (ACTA), 34 Yale J. Int'l L. 247 at p. 250 (2009); Robin
Gross, On the Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) (Mar. 25, 2008),
http://ipjustice.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/IPJustice_ACTA-white-paper-mar2008.pdf at
pp.4-5. see (arguing that ACTA is ―undemocratic‖ and ―imperialistic‖ treaty since ACTA
will ultimately be imposed on countries that have not participated in the negotiations of its
provisions, mainly developing countries.‖); see also, Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and its
Discontents, 10 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 369 (2006) (providing four different narratives
of the origins of the TRIPS Agreement: the bargain narrative, the coercion narrative, the
ignorance narrative, and the self-interest narrative); Peter Drahos, Global Property Rights
in Information: The Story of TRIPS at the GATT, 13(1) Prometheus 6, at p. 16 (1995) (
arguing that ―[t]he intellectual property story [including its TRIPS segment] is one of
coercion, but it is economic rather than military in kind‖).
36
After the U.S signed its free trade agreement with Jordan, the U.S presented Jordan
to the Arabic World as a role model that should be followed, see, e.g., U.S. – UAE Free
Trade Agreement Press Conference (Mar. 8, 2005),
http://abudhabi.usembassy.gov/pr_10mar2005.html.
37
Peter Drahos defines ―framing‖ as ―a form of public dialogue in which actors
wishing to change political processes offer an alternative conceptual scheme through which
to reinterpret those processes‖, see Peter Drahos, Does Dialogue Make a Difference?
Structural Change and the Limits of Framing, 117 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 268 (2008).
38
Office of the United States Trade Representative, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement - Summary of Key Elements under Discussion (Nov. 6, 2009),
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1479.
39
See Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics
of Intellectual Property,117 Yale L.J. 804, at p. 484 (2008) (describing the ―public
interest‖ frame in which the American industry lobby presented the issue of intellectual
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countries in ACTA are placing more emphasis on the ―security‖ and
―safety‖ aspect of the enforceability issue.40 This framing tactic aims at
generating public support and involving a network of actors, both national
and international, private and public, in the enforcement of intellectual
property rights.41 An example of this network-based partnership toward
stronger means of intellectual property enforcement is embodied in ―The
Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy‖ launched in
2004 to address the problem of trade in counterfeit and pirated goods as a
health hazard and a source of funding for organized crime. This conference
initiated the very early thoughts of ACTA and continues to support its
conclusion.42
The third technique that developed countries are using to ratchet up the
international intellectual property law regime through ACTA is the floorbased approach toward the levels of protection and enforcement provided
under the proposed treaty. The obligations of ACTA will reflect only a
floor, not a ceiling, for enforcement of intellectual property rights, which
means that countries are free to adopt stronger measures of enforceability.43
The floor-without-a-ceiling approach toward the protection and
enforceability of intellectual property rights reflects an infrastructural bias
in the international intellectual property regime generally and ACTA
specifically against users of intellectual property.44 It means that the regime
does not seek to balance the interests of right holders and users of
intellectual property, but instead impliedly welcomes the expansion of

property protection in order to show the need for the TRIPS Agreement)
40
Susan K. Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy
Enforcement Efforts: The State of Play (Jun. 9, 2008), http://www.iqsensato.org/wpcontent/uploads/Sell_IP_Enforcement_State_of_Play-OPs_1_June_2008.pdf.
41
Susan K. Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy
Enforcement Efforts: The State of Play (Jun. 9, 2008), http://www.iqsensato.org/wpcontent/uploads/Sell_IP_Enforcement_State_of_Play-OPs_1_June_2008.pdf.; and The
Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade: Agreement (ACTA): Global Policy Implications,
IQSensato's In Focus, Volume 2, Number 8 (Jun. 2, 2008) at p.6,
http://www.iqsensato.org/wp-content/uploads/InFocus%20-ACTA%20-%20Vol%202%20Issue%208.pdf.; Peter Drahos, Securing the Future of Intellectual Property: Intellectual
Property Owners and Their Nodally Coordinated Enforcement Pyramid, 36 Case
W.Res.J.Int‘l L. 53, at p.54 (2004)(arguing that ―nodal coordination of an international
enforcement pyramid offers non-state actors the possibility of securing compliance by
states with emerging global standard of intellectual property rights‖).
42
See, Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy,
http://www.ccapcongress.net/index.htm.
43
See, ACTA Official Draft, supra note X Ch.1, s.A, art.1.2(1); ACTA July Draft,
supra note X Ch.1, s.A, art.1.2(1).
44
Peter Drahos, BITS and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4(6) JWIP 791
at p.798 (2001)(stating that integrating a ―minimum standard‖ mode of protection in
international intellectual property agreements is an element in the efforts toward ratcheting
up the protection and enforceability of intellectual property).
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intellectual property protection and enforceability. This conclusion is
supported by the fact that the treaty provides that it would only be
concerned with enforcing existing intellectual property rights, 45 but, on the
other hand, the legal framework of the treaty would provide right holders
with new substantive rights, such as in the case of the right to protect
technological protection measures.46
The second goal that industrial countries are looking for through ACTA
is to oppose the recent success of developing countries to bring about the
WIPO Development Agenda.47 The WIPO Development Agenda has 45
recommendations categorized under 6 clusters (A-F).48 Under these
clusters, some recommendations are well aware of the danger of excessive
levels of copyright protection. For example, Recommendation 10 calls for
―making national intellectual property institutions more efficient‖ and
―[promoting] fair balance between intellectual property protection and the
public interest.‖ Recommendation 15 calls for WIPO‘s norm-setting to take
into consideration ―different levels of development‖ and ―a balance between
costs and benefits. Further, recommendation 16 calls for ―the preservation
of the public domain within WIPO‘s normative processes and deepen the
analysis of the implications and benefits of a rich and accessible public
domain.‖ Recommendation 25 is also important as it calls for ―[promoting]
the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the benefit of developing
countries and to take appropriate measures to enable developing countries
to fully understand and benefit from different provisions, pertaining to
flexibilities provided for in international agreements, as appropriate.‖
Finally, Recommendation 45 calls for the ―societal interest‖ and the
―development-oriented concerns‖ of developing countries to be taken into
consideration when approaching intellectual property enforcement. The
same recommendation emphasizes that ―‗the protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of

45

See, ACTA Official Draft, supra note X at ch.1, s.A, art.1.3(2); ACTA July Draft,
supra note X Ch.1, s.A, art. art.1.3(2).
46
See, infra.
47
See, Assemblies of the Member States of WIPO, General Report, Forty-Third Series
of Meetings, Geneva, Sep. 24 to Oct. 3, 2007 (A/43/16),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/govbody/en/a_43/a_43_16-main1.pdf [hereinafter WIPO
Development Agenda].
48
Cluster A: Technical Assistance and Capacity Building; Cluster B: Norm-setting,
flexibilities, public policy and public domain; Cluster C: Technology Transfer, Information
and Communication Technologies (ICT) and Access to Knowledge; Cluster D:
Assessment, Evaluation and Impact Studies; Cluster E: Institutional Matters including
Mandate and Governance; and Cluster F: Other Issues, see The 45 Adopted
Recommendations under the WIPO Development Agenda, http://www.wipo.int/ipdevelopment/en/agenda/recommendations.html.
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technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological
knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and
to a balance of rights and obligations,‘ in accordance with Article 7 of the
TRIPS Agreement.‖ The WIPO Development Agenda is considered to be a
continuation of developing countries‘ struggle to achieve a fair international
intellectual property regime.49 The history of international intellectual
property norm setting shows that industrial countries were usually reluctant
to accept initiatives proposed to reform the international intellectual
property regime in light of a development purpose.50 Thus, it is reasonable
to believe that ACTA is a counter attack against the WIPO Development
Agenda.51
Similar to preceding battles to win more control over intellectual
property, such as in TRIPS and TRIP-Plus regimes, ACTA would have a
serious impact not only on developing countries and their citizens but also
on the citizens of the industrial countries.52 ACTA will shift the cost of
intellectual property enforcement from the shoulders of the rights holders of
intellectual property rights to the shoulders of the public which ultimately
would be required, through taxes, to finance the steps taken by authorities
according to ACTA.53 Furthermore, the content of ACTA has been a
concern for industrial countries‘ citizen rights and freedoms as much as it is
for developing countries since the treaty includes provision that may impact
fundamental freedoms available to individuals under intellectual property
49

Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 35 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 465 (2009)
(arguing that the efforts taken by less-developed countries through advancing development
agendas at the WIPO, WTO and other international foras to develop an innovation and
intellectual property regime considerate of their development needs are ―remarkably
similar‖ in motives and goals to their efforts taken between the period of 1960-1970).
50

E.g., when developing countries managed to introduce the Stockholm Protocol,
developed countries failed the protocol by refraining from ratifying it, De Sanctis, The
International Copyright Conventions, 14 Copyright 254, at p. 258 (1978); Peter Burger,
The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role in the Future, 3 J.L. & Tech. 3, at p.20
(1988).
51
See, Michael Geist, The ACTA Threat To The Future Of WIPO (Apr. 14, 2009),
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/04/14/the-acta-threat-to-the-future-of-wipo/
(arguing that ACTA poses a serious danger on the success of the WIPO Development
Agenda).
52
See, Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International
Intellectual Property Protection, UOLTJ 125, at p. 141 (2003-2004)(arguing that
bilateralism expanded intellectual property protection and enforceability ―at the expense of
the public interest both in developed and developing countries.‖)
53
See, Charles R. McManis, The Proposed Anti-CounterfeitingTradeAgreement
(ACTA): Two Tales of A Treaty, 46 Hous. L. Rev. 1235 at p. 1237 (2009); Robin Gross, On
the Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) (Mar. 25, 2008),
http://ipjustice.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/IPJustice_ACTA-white-paper-mar2008.pdf at p.
6.
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law and other legal regimes.54
Shortly after the launch of the treaty negotiations, scholars started to
predict the content of the treaty and to evaluate its possible impact on the
international intellectual property regime and on the national laws of other
countries. This research has continued with the official release and leaks of
ACTA content. In this vein, the next part of this paper evaluates the impact
of the legal framework of the treaty on Canadian copyright law.
III.

THE IMPACT OF ACTA ON CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW

Canada‘s situation in the ongoing negotiations of ACTA is unique, as it
is participating in the negotiations at the same time that it is carrying out a
major reform to its Copyright Act. Thus, the impact of ACTA, the
provisions of which are not already well settled, needs to be looked at in
light of Bill C-32‘s proposed amendments to modernize the Copyright Act.
The following parts discuss the impact of the ACTA legal framework on the
Canadian copyright law.
A. Civil Enforcement
Civil enforcement is covered under the second chapter of ACTA, which
also deals with the legal framework of criminal and technological
enforcement of intellectual property rights as well as with border measures.
The civil enforcement section in ACTA includes granting judicial
authorities in member states the ability to issue desist orders against
infringement and to issue orders to keep the infringing goods outside the
channels of commerce.55 Further, the treaty would provide courts with the
authority to order the infringer to pay the rights holders all the profit
ensuing from the infringement.56 Amongst the factors that the court may
take into consideration when evaluating damages are the profit made from
the infringement, the market price of the infringed goods or services, and

54

See, Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 Va.J.Int‘l L. 369 at
pp.373-374 (1997). (Noting that the digital agenda which the United States officials sought
to adopt in the diplomatic conference in Geneva that led to the conclusion of WIPO
Internet was almost identical to the digital agenda they had unsuccessfully sought to pass
by the Congress, meaning that the U.S. officials tried to have ―an end run around
Congress‖).
55

ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.1, art.2.X; ACTA Official Draft, supra note
X ch.2, s.1, art.2.X.
56
ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.1, art.2.2(2); ACTA Official Draft, supra
note X ch.2, s.1, art.2.2(a)(ii).
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the suggested sale price. 57 These requirements of ACTA are not expected
to have a large impact on Canadian copyright law. The Copyright Act now
provides rights holders with a wide range of remedies that include what
ACTA would ask for. Copyright owners whose rights have been infringed
are entitled to ―all remedies,‖ including injunctions, compensatory and
punitive damages, account of profits and delivery up of infringing goods.58
One of the major obligations that ACTA would impose on the copyright
laws of its members is the requirement of establishing a system of statutory
damages.59 Under this regime, copyright statutes provide rights holders
with the option to claim from infringers a certain amount of damages, not
going beyond or falling below the range determined by the statute, for each
work infringed. The underlying policy behind this regime is to overcome
the economic and evidentiary hurdles that right holders face in proving
actual damages.60 The system of statutory damages has been described as
―frequently arbitrary, inconsistent, unprincipled, and sometimes grossly
excessive.‖61 While some of the countries negotiating ACTA have a system
of statutory damages, such as the U.S. and Canada,62 others do not, and will
need to amend their relevant laws to give effect to this provision.63 The
Canadian Copyright Act has a statutory damages regime, which can be
elected as an alternative to damages and an account of profits.64 The current
range of statutory damages it sets is between $500 and $20,000. When the
57

ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.1, art.2.2(1); ACTA Official Draft, supra
note X ch.2, s.1, art.2.2(1)(b).
58
Copyright Act, supra note X, s. 34.(1). Section 35(1) provides that the copyright
owner can ask for both damages and account of profits.
59
ACTA Official Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.1, art.2.2(2); ACTA July Draft, supra
note X ch.2, s.1, art.2.2(3);
60
Telewizja Polsat S.A. v. Radiopol Inc., 2006 FC 584, 52 C.P.R. (4th) 445, [2007] 1
F.C.R. 444, 292 F.T.R. 195 (Eng.) at para.40.; ELIZABETH F. JUDGE & DANIEL
GERVAIS, INTELLECTUAL PROEPRTY: THE LAW IN CANADA, (2005); Pamela
Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of
Reform, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 439, 510. (2009).
61
see Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A
Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 439, 441 (2009)
62
17 U.S.C.A. § 504(c).
63
E.g., Australia and New Zealand, see Kimberlee Weatherall, The AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement: Analysis of the January Consolidated Text (Apr.2010),
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&context=kimweatherall.
64
Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, s. 38.1 provides ―(1) Subject to this section, a
copyright owner may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover,
instead of damages and profits referred to in subsection 35(1), an award of statutory
damages for all infringements involved in the proceedings, with respect to any one work or
other subject-matter, for which any one infringer is liable individually, or for which any
two or more infringers are liable jointly and severally, in a sum of not less than $500 or
more than $20,000 as the court considers just.‖ Bill C-32 would lower the range of
statutory damages for non-commercial uses to a ceiling of $5,000 and a floor of $100. Bill
C-32, supra note X at s. 46.
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court is convinced that the defendant was unaware of the infringement or
had no reasonable grounds to believe that they were infringing copyrights,
the court may reduce the minimum of the statutory damages to $200 per
work.65 In special cases, the Copyright Act allows courts to reduce the
statutory damages awarded below the stated minimums ($500 and $200),
when the infringement involves more than one work in one single medium
and at the same time when the awarding of these minimums would be
―grossly out of proportion to the infringement.‖ 66 These flexibilities that
the Copyright Act provides in its statutory damages system would not
conflict with ACTA obligations, for the treaty does not specify the details of
the statutory damages it proposes. Further, these flexibilities are in
harmony with a proposed provision in the treaty suggesting that the adopted
measures with respect to civil enforcement shall be ―fair and equitable‖67
and proportionate to the seriousness of the infringement and the rights of
third parties involved.68
The civil enforcement section in ACTA further provides that infringers,
who knowingly infringe or have reasonable ground to know that they are
infringing, will be required to pay right holder damages for the infringement
in the amount of the harm sustained by the rights holders.69 The July draft
overcame the fear that innocent infringement may be targeted by this
provision, which was a possibility in light of the proposals in the official
draft.70 However, the treaty would still cover infringement even when it is
non-commercial in nature, a fact that sheds doubt on one of the stated
underlying justifications of the treaty, which is to combat large-scale piracy.
Even if the ACTA targeted innocent infringers, this would not cause any
noncompliance concerns for Canadian copyright law. Although the
Copyright Act takes into consideration the knowledge or intention of the
infringer in certain instances, such as in awarding criminal penalties and for
certain remedies, Canadian copyright law as a general rule does not treat
innocent infringement differently from infringement. The Act makes it an
infringement to do, without the consent of the right holder, any of the
exclusive rights granted to rights holders under the Act.71 Knowledge of the

65

Copyright Act, supra note X, s. 38.1(2).
Copyright Act, supra note X, s. 38.1(3).
67
ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, art.2.X(2).
68
ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, art.2.X(2); ACTA Official Draft, supra note X
ch.2, s.1, art.2.3(4) (discusses proportionality under the section of civil enforcement). It is
still unclear whether this will be applicable to the whole legal framework proposed in
chapter 1 of the treaty or merely to the civil and criminal enforcement sections.
69
ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.1, art.2.2(1).
70
ACTA Official Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.1, art.2.2(1)(a).
71
Copyright Act, supra note X, s.27(1).
66
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infringement or intention to infringe is not a condition to finding that
infringement of copyright has been established. In fact, Canadian courts
have treated ―unconscious copying‖ as infringement.72
Innocent
infringement does limit the plaintiff‘s remedies: if the defendant was not
aware and had not reasonable ground for suspecting there was copyright,
damages are not available and the plaintiff is entitled only to an
injunction.73 This limitation does not apply if copyright is registered.
Further, as noted above for statutory damages, the court may reduce the
minimum award for statutory damages to $200 for innocent infringement.74
Other remedies speculated by the civil enforcement section include granting
courts the authority to award rights holder prevailing in the civil procedure
costs, fees and attorney‘s fees,75 which is in harmony with the provisions of
the Canadian Copyright Act.76 Furthermore, the civil remedies may include
destroying the infringing goods77 and destroying the materials essentially
used in the making of the infringing goods, or taking them out of the
channel of commerce.78 The Copyright Act grants rights holders the right
to recover the infringing copies, to issue an order for their seizure, and for
destruction of the infringing copies..79
Finally, ACTA provides that infringers may be required to submit
information on the source of the infringing goods and the individuals
involved in any aspect of the infringement.80 The Canadian Copyright Act
will need to be amended to accommodate the information-based remedies
that ACTA provides. In other words, the Act needs to incorporate the
ACTA requirement by giving courts the authority to oblige infringers to
disclose information with respect to the source of the copyright-infringing
materials and the individuals involved in the infringement.81

72

Gondos v. Hardy (1982), 64 C.P.R. (2d) 145 (Ont. H.C.); see ELIZABETH F.
JUDGE & DANIEL GERVAIS, INTELLECTUAL PROEPRTY: THE LAW IN
CANADA, (2005).
73
Copyright Act, supra X, s. 39.
74
Copyright Act, supra X, s. 38(2), (3) and (5).
75
ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.1, art.2.2(5).
76
Copyright Act, supra note X, s.34(3)
77
ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.1, art.2.3(1); ACTA Official Draft, supra
note X ch.2, s.1, art.2.3(1) 2.3(1).
78
ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.1, art.2.3(2); ACTA Official Draft, supra
note X ch.2, s.1, art.2.3(2).
79
Copyright Act, supra note X, s.38(1) and 38(2)
80
ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.1, art.2.4; ACTA Official Draft, supra note
X ch.2, s.1, art.2.4.
81
ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.1, art.2.4; ACTA Official Draft, supra note
X ch.2, s.1, art.2.4.
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B. Criminal Enforcement
The section of ACTA on criminal enforcement obliges member states
to criminalize at least ―willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright or
related rights piracy on a commercial scale.‖ 82 Under the official draft,
with respect to copyright and related rights piracy, it was proposed that
the ―commercial scale‖ requirement for criminalization is satisfied not
only when piracy is for the purpose of ―financial gain or commercial
advantage,‖ but also when it is ―significant‖ and ―willful,‖ even if it does
not have ―direct or indirect motivation of financial gain. 83 The July draft,
however, has a different proposal, which suggests that the commercial
scale requirement is satisfied only when the infringing/piracy acts are
―carried out in the context of commercial activity for direct or indirect
economic or commercial‖ use. 84 This section is not likely to require
Canada to modify its current treatment to criminal remedies under its
copyright law regime given that the Copyright Act already includes a list
of copyright-infringing activities that would cover ACTA‘s requirements
to criminalize willful copyright or related rights piracy. Section 42(1) of
the Copyright Act criminalizes certain intentional and commercial
copyright infringing activities, including making, selling, renting, offering
for sale or rent, exhibiting in public, and importing into Canada an
infringing copy of a copyrighted work or other copyrighted subject
matter. 85 The Canadian Copyright Act may actually go beyond the July
draft and comply with the wider scope of criminalization available in the
official draft of ACTA, which provided that the ―commercial scale‖
requirement for criminalizing piracy could be satisfied when it is
―significant‖ and ―willful‖ even if it does not involve a commercial
activity or does not have ―direct or indirect motivation of financial
gain‖. 86
The Canadian Copyright Act, similarly, criminalizes the
distribution of infringing copies for commercial purposes or ―to such an
extent as to affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright.‖ 87
The penalties that the criminal enforcement section in ACTA may
require member states to impose for crimes and offences include
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ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.3.14(1) leak. ACTA Official Draft, supra
note X ch.2, s.3, art.2.14(1).
83
ACTA Official Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.3, art.2.14 (a)(b).
84
ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.3, art.2.14(1) leak.
85
Copyright Act, supra note X, s.42.(1)(a)(b)(d)(e).
86
ACTA Official Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.3, art.2.14 (a)(b).
87
Copyright Act, supra note X, s. 42.(1)(c)
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imprisonment and monetary fines.
The infringing goods would be
subject to seizure, forfeiture and destruction. 89 Correspondingly, a person
found guilty of committing any of the section 42(1) offences is liable
under the Canadian Copyright Act ―on summary conviction, to a fine not
exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding six months or to both, or [] on conviction on indictment, to a
fine not exceeding one million dollars or to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding five years or to both.‖ 90 Moreover, the Copyright Act subjects
the infringing copies to destruction or delivery up. 91
Since ACTA allows member states to exempt end consumers from
criminal liability when receiving pirated copies, 92 the Copyright Act‘s
silence with respect to the criminal liability of end consumers would not
render the Canadian Copyright Act non-compliant with the ACTA.
Canadian copyright law also complies with the obligation to criminalize
the unauthorized recording of a movie, 93 since Canada amended its
Criminal Code in 2007 to include this offence. 94
There are some areas where ACTA may require some modification to
the Copyright Act‘s treatment of criminal remedies. While the treaty may
have a provision, suggested by the EU, requiring countries to adopt
measures to ―establish the liability of legal persons‖ for the said
offences, 95 the Copyright Act does not have criminal liability for
corporations. Also, ACTA would possibly, under the EU suggestion,
criminalize inciting, aiding and abetting the offences mentioned in the
criminal enforcement section of ACTA. 96 However, the Copyright Act
does not have a provision covering these proposed offences. One more
important obligation that the criminal enforcement section in ACTA
speculates is to require member states to provide their competent

88

ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.3, art.2.15; ACTA Official Draft, supra note
X ch.2, s.3, art.2.15(3)
89
ACTA Official Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.3, art.2.16.; ACTA July Draft, supra
note X ch.2, s.3, art. 2.16.
90
Copyright Act, supra note X, s. 42.(1)(f)(g).
91
Copyright Act, supra note X, s. 42(3).
92
ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.3, art.2.14(1) leak.
93
ACTA Official Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.3, art.2.14(3); ACTA July Draft, supra
note X ch.2, s.3, art.2.14(3). The EU and Singapore suggested deleting this provision.
94
Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s. 432, Department of Justice Canada
<http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/showdoc/cs/C-46///en?page=1>; R.S.C, 1985, c. 27 (1st
Supp.), s. 58; 2007, c. 28, s. 1.
95
ACTA July Draft, supra note X, ch.2, s.3, art.2.14(4); ACTA Official Draft, supra
note X ch.2, s.3, art.2.15(1).
96
ACTA Official Draft, supra note X, ch.2, s.3, art.15(2); 2.14(3) EU suggestion.
Please note that the subsection here confusingly has the same number of the subsection
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authorities with ex officio criminal enforcement, enabling criminal
procedures to be initiated without having to be predicated on a complaint
from rights holders. 97 Since Canadian authorities have no ex officio
competence under the copyright law with respect to investigating and
prosecuting offences pertinent to copyright infringement, ACTA may
require Canada to reexamine its position with respect to this matter. 98
C. Border Measures
The border measures section in ACTA deals with member states‘
authority with respect to goods that are suspected of infringing intellectual
property rights when they are imported, exported, in transit, or under
custom supervision. 99 While infringement of all forms of intellectual
property is covered under this section as a rule, there is a possibility for
an exception allowing member states to exclude certain forms of
intellectual property rights, other than copyright, trademarks, and
geographical indications, from these measures. 100 The scope of this
exception and what rights may fall under it is very controversial.
The border measures section includes a de minimis provision that
would allow member states to exclude goods that are non-commercial in
quantity and nature and contained in travellers‘ baggage (or ―sent in small
consignment‖) from the actions described in this section. 101
This
exception is intended to overcome the fear that ACTA would subject
travellers‘ baggage, portable computers, and portable media recorders to
inspection for copyright-infringing materials. The section is likely to have
a provision that requires member states to provide procedures enabling
right holders to ask custom authorities to suspend the release of goods
suspected of intellectual property infringement. 102 It is not obvious
whether the scope of this measure may be limited only to ―pirated

requiring the criminalization of camcording.
97
ACTA Official Draft, supra note X, ch.2, s.3, art.2.17; ACTA July Draft, supra note
X ch.2, s.3, art.2.17.
98
ACTA Official Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.3, art.2.17; ACTA July Draft, supra note
X ch.2, s.3, art.2.17.
99
ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.2, art.2.x(1); ACTA Official Draft, supra
note X ch.2, s.2, art.2.x(1).
100
ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.2, art.2.x(2); ACTA Official Draft, supra
note X ch.2, s.2, art.2.x(2) official.
101
ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.2, art.2.X; ACTA Official Draft, supra note
X ch.2, s.2, art. 2.X.
102
ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.2, art.2.6; ACTA Official Draft, supra note
X ch.2, s.2, art.2.6.
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copyright works‖ or ―counterfeit trademarks goods‖ or will extend to
cover ―intellectual property infringement‖ in general. It is also not clear
whether the measure will be limited to shipments for ―import‖ or may
extend to cover export and in transit shipments. All these options are
possible according to the current draft. 103 There is a possibility under the
draft to grant custom authorities ex officio authority (―may act upon their
own initiative‖ without any request from right holders) to take the
measure of suspending the release of the suspected infringing goods. 104
The section includes a provision asking member states to give its
authorities the power to request a reasonable security from right holders
in order to protect the defendant and authorities from any abuse of
procedures by right holders. 105 The draft gives custom authorities the
ability to decide whether the suspended goods suspected of infringement
are truly infringing or not. 106 Upon finding infringement, authorities may
order the destruction of the goods, or if the goods are not destroyed, some
countries have suggested that the goods be kept ―outside the channels of
commerce.‖ 107 To indentify infringing shipments, but without prejudice to
the countries‘ law of privacy and confidential information, authorities may
provide rights holders with information about goods or specific
shipments. 108
Canada‘s Copyright Act includes some provisions on border measures.
The Act prohibits certain acts of secondary infringement, including the
importation of copies that would have infringed copyright if they had been
made in Canada. 109 The Copyright Act has procedural mechanisms for the
copyright owner or exclusive licensee to apply for a court order to stop
copies and related rights material at the border that would constitute
secondary infringement by importation. 110 However, the more expansive
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ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.2, art.2.6; ACTA Official Draft, supra note
X ch.2, s.2,art.2.6.
104
ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.2, art.2.7; ACTA Official Draft, supra note
X ch.2, s.2, art.2.7.
105
ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.2, art.2.9; ACTA Official Draft, supra note
X ch.2, s.2, art.2.9.
106
ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.2, art.2.10; ACTA Official Draft, supra
note X ch.2, s.2, art.2.10.
107
ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.2, art.2.11; ACTA Official Draft, supra
note X ch.2, s.2, art.2.11.
108
ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.2, art.2.13; ACTA Official Draft, supra note
X ch.2, s.2, art.2.13.
109
Copyright Act, supra note X, s. 27(2).
110
Copyright Act, supra note X, ss. 44, 44.2 and 44.4. Section 45 provides exceptions
for individuals, government, libraries, archives, museums, and educational institutions to
import copies if the relevant copyright owner where they were made consented and also
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provisions of ACTA for border measures are not included in the current
statute, and thus ACTA is expected to have a conspicuous impact on
Canadian copyright law in this domain.
The border measures
requirements that ACTA is proposing, such as granting custom authorities
with ex officio authority, would be highly disruptive of established user
rights and exceptions under Canadian copyright law, such as fair dealing,
where the complex nature of the inquiry demands that the proper preserve
for the inquiry is the courts rather than custom officials. 111
D. Enforcement in the Digital Environment
The ACTA section of enforcement in the digital environment is highly
bracketed. 112 There is still no agreement whether the rights covered under
this section are all ―intellectual property rights‖ or only ―trademarks and
copyright and related rights.‖ The section requires providing the same
civil and criminal enforcement to intellectual property rights (or
trademarks and copyright and related rights) against infringements in the
digital environment or carried out by the internet. 113 There is a suggestion
by the EU, Switzerland, and New Zealand for a provision stating that the
digital environment enforcement measures need to be ―fair and
proportionate.‖ 114 These countries also suggest that this provision be
moved to section ―A‖ of the first chapter and, therefore, be applicable to
the whole treaty. 115 The enforcement in the digital environment deals with
four major issues that are expected to impact Canadian copyright law.
1. Third Party Liability
The digital enforcement section of ACTA requires members states to
establish a system of third party liability which makes anyone who
―authorizes for a direct financial benefit, induces through or by conduct

provides exceptions for used books (excluding textbooks) to be imported.
111
Michael Geist, ACTA Emergency Communique: Add Your Name Today (Jun.21,
2010), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/5134/125/.; International Experts Find that
Pending Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Threatens Public Interests (Jun. 23, 2010),
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/acta-communique.
112
Canada has reserved its position on this section.
113
ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4, art.2.18(1); ACTA Official Draft, supra
note X ch.2, s.4, art.2.18(1).
114
ACTA Official Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4, art.2.18(2); ACTA July Draft, supra
note X ch.2, s.4, art.2.18(1).
115
ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4, art.2.18(1); ACTA Official Draft, supra
note X ch.2, s.4, footnote 46.
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directed to promoting infringement, or knowingly and materially aids any
act of copyright or related rights infringement by another‖ liable. 116 The
treaty would subject individuals violating this by means of these acts to
the civil remedies available under this section, without prejudice to the
exception and limitations available under the laws of the relevant
country. 117 This provision presents an example where ACTA goes beyond
its purpose as an enforcement treaty to a treaty providing substantive
rights over intellectual property, especially given that the third-party
liability regime has no foundations in the international intellectual
property regime. 118 Still, there is no agreement on the scope of the rights
covered under this provision and to which of the intellectual property
rights—patent, industrial design, trademark and copyright or related
rights—it applies.
ACTA‘s treatment of third-party liability is problematic. The ACTA
definition of third-party liability is troubling for the Canadian copyright
law. It provides legal remedies in cases where the Canadian law does not
establish infringement or award remedies. For example, unlike the
situation in the U.S, 119 which distinguishes vicarious and contributory
infringement and recognizes that someone who does not directly infringe
copyright may nevertheless infringe by contributing or encouraging
infringement, under Canadian copyright law there is the single concept of
secondary infringement which does not expressly include mere
contribution to infringement. Current Canadian law also does not include
inducement-based infringement. This situation would change if Bill C-32
passes since it provides:

116

It is proposed that the definition third party liability be as follows: ―third party
liability means liability for any person who authorizes for a direct financial benefit, induces
through or by conduct directed to promoting infringement, or knowingly and materially
aids any act of copyright or related rights infringement by another. Further, the Parties also
understand that the application of third party liability may include consideration of
exceptions or limitations to exclusive rights that are confined to certain special cases that
do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work, performance or phonogram, and do
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder, including fair use,
fair dealing, or their equivalents.‖. See ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4, footnote
46; ACTA Official Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4, footnote 47.
117
(2.18.3); ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4, art.2.18(2).
118
Library Copyright Alliance, Concerns with April 2010 ACTA Text (Apr. 23, 2010),
http://www.librarycopyrightalliance.org/bm~doc/consolidatedtextcomments423.pdf.
119
E.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.545 U.S. 913 (2005);
ARISTA RECORDS LLC, et. al, v. LIME GROUP LLC et al., (Case 1:06-cv-05936KMW Document 216 Filed 05/11/201); COLUMBIA PICTURES INDUSTRIES, INC., et
al.,v. GARY FUNG, et al. (Case 2:06-cv-05578-SVW-JC Document 391 Filed
12/21/2009).
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(2.3) It is an infringement of copyright for a person to provide, by
means of the Internet or another digital network, a service that the
person knows or should have known is designed primarily to enable
acts of copyright infringement if an actual infringement of copyright
occurs by means of the Internet or another digital network as a result of
120
the use of that service.

Under Canadian law, the statutory right to authorize the rights holder‘s
exclusive rights is an autonomous right that is separate from the
performance of those acts. 121 Infringement cases involving a third party
providing technologies or tools by which infringement takes place could
be covered under the notion of infringement by means of ―authorization,‖
which is a primary type of infringement rather than secondary, and has a
different meaning than the meanings afforded to it in other jurisdictions.
It breaches the authorization right of copyright holders embodied in
section 3(1) of the Copyright Act. The Supreme Court of Canada had the
chance to clarify the meaning of ―authorization‖ under the Copyright Act
in two leading cases.
122
In CCH Canadian Ltd. v Law Society of Upper Canada,
the
Supreme Court addressed whether a library providing photocopying
services to its users amounted to authorizing these users to infringe the
copyrights of some of the publishers of the resources available in the
library. The Supreme Court held that such activity did not ―constitute
authorization to use the photocopiers to breach copyright law.‖ 123 The
Supreme Court added:
―[A] person does not authorize copyright
infringement by authorizing the mere use of equipment (such as
photocopiers) that could be used to infringe copyright. In fact, courts
should presume that a person who authorizes an activity does so only so
far as it is in accordance with the law. ‖ 124 The Supreme Court identified
the meaning of ―authorization‖ as to ―[g]ive approval to; sanction,
permit; favour, encourage.‖ 125 Further it held that the Law Society did
not have enough control over the users of the library to have ―sanctioned,
approved or countenanced the infringement.‖ 126
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Bill C-32, supra note X, ss. 27(2.3).
Copyright Act, supra note X, ss. 3 and 27.
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CCH Canadian Ltd. v Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339
[hereinafter CCH ].
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CCH, supra note X at para.42
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CCH, supra note X at para.43.
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CCH, supra note X at para.38
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CCH, supra note X at para.45.
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In Canadian Association of Internet Service Providers v Society of
Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 127 the Supreme
Court concluded that ISPs were not liable to pay a tariff to a collective
society for for the communication of musical works in the collective‘s
repertoire over the internet and found, in part, that ISPs were not
―authorizing‖ copyright infringement. The Supreme Court held that
―when massive amounts of non-copyrighted material are accessible to the
end user, it is not possible to impute to the Internet Service Provider,
based solely on the provision of Internet facilities, an authority to
download copyrighted material as opposed to non-copyrighted
material.‖ 128 The Court followed the teachings of CCH129 that the
knowledge that people may be engaged in copyright infringement by
means of a neutral or dual-use technology (such as a photocopier in the
library) did not constitute authorization of copyright infringement. 130 The
Court held that to find authorization the defendants must have ―approved,
sanctioned, permitted, favoured or encouraged‖ the infringement. 131
ACTA would thus introduce to Canada a notion of third-party liability
that is not in harmony with the status quo of the Canadian copyright law.
2. ISPs Safe Harbor
The third-party liability system in ACTA obliges (allows according to
Switzerland) member states to adopt a system limiting the civil liability of
internet service providers (hereinafter ISPs). The treaty speculates a
provision that would have ―a safe harbour‖ 132-like effect on ISPs‘
liability. 133 The July draft slightly overcomes some of the confusion that
ISP liability issue raises in the official draft. The section would limit ISP
liability at least for copyright or related rights infringements in three
circumstances. First, ISP liability is limited, when the infringement of a
copyright or a related right takes place by ―automatic technical process 134
as part of the transmission of material when the online service provider
127

Canadian Association of Internet Service Providers v Society of Composers,
Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2004 SCC 45 [Tariff 22 case].
128
SOCAN 123.
129
CCH Canadian Ltd. v Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339
[hereinafter CCH ].
130
Tariff 22 case, supra note X at para. 123&124.
131
Tariff 22 case, supra note X at para.127.
132
17 U.S.C.A. § 512.
133
ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4, art. 2.18(3).
134
―Japan is proposing that this technical process makes the ISP unable to prevent the
infringement‖
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did not initiate the transmission, did not select or modify the material, and
did not select the recipient of the material.‖ 135 In other words, this
exception protects an ISP from liability that may ensue from its function
as ―conduit‖ or ―channel‖ for transmitting the infringing materials.
Second, ISP liability is limited when the infringement of a copyright
or a related right takes place by ―the automatic, intermediate, and
temporary storage of material made available online by a person other
than the online service provider and transmitted by the online service
provider to its users without modification of the material.‖ 136 In other
words, the ISP is exempted from liability for its caching activities. This
exception is limited by a ―notice and take down‖ burden whereby an
ISP‘s immunity is conditioned upon ―expeditiously137 removing or
disabling access to material upon receipt of a legally sufficient notice of
alleged infringement concerning material that has previously been
removed from the originating site.‖ 138
Third, ISP liability is limited when the infringement of a copyright or
a related right takes place by ―storage of material provided by a user of
the online service provider.‖ 139 This paragraph exempts an ISP from the
legal liability that may ensue from hosting infringing material. Canada,
the U.S, and the EU are in favour of extending this provision to exempt
―referring or linking users to an online location containing infringing
material or activity.‖ 140 The whole provision of the hosting exception is
not finalized: it is still bracketed. The applicability of the hosting,
referring or linking exemption is possibly to be conditioned upon the ISP
not receiving financial gain directly attributable to the infringement; the
ISP expeditiously removing the content or disabling the access to it once it
has actual knowledge of the infringement (through a legal notice for
example) or reasonable ground to be aware of it; and the ISP not being
aware of a court decision holding that the hosted material is infringing. 141
In providing ISPs with immunity under this section, countries cannot
impose an obligation on ISPs to assume a monitoring activity while
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ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4, art.2.18(3)(a)(i).
ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4, art.2.18(3)(a)(ii).
137
Canada is suggesting to add ―or within a definite period of time‖ after the word
―expeditiously.‖ Japan is suggesting more restrictive language that requires the ISP to take
down the content once it knows or has reasonable grounds to about the infringement.
138
ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4, art.2.18(3)(b).
139
ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4, art.2.18(3)(a)(iii).
140
ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4, art.2.18(3)(a)(iii).
141
ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4, art.2.18(3)(c)
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providing its services.
Japan is proposing a provision requiring member states to grant their
judicial authorities the ability to order an ISP to release the information of
the relevant subscriber to the right holders when right holders have made
a legal and reasonable claim that the subscriber has infringed their
rights. 143 It is also proposing a provision speculating the establishment of
guidelines between ISPs and right holders with respect to ―dealing
effectively‖ with infringement of IP rights on the internet. 144 The ISP
liability regime under ACTA does not adopt the so called ―graduated
response or three strike‖ sanction, a measure whereby ISPs punish their
customers who have been warned three times that their online activities is
suspected of infringing copyrights by cutting their internet service. This
measure is available in South Korea, France, and Taiwan. 145
Under Canadian copyright law, by the nature of their functions, ISPs
find themselves involved in communicating and temporarily reproducing
copyrighted works or copyright infringing content and authorizing such
acts. 146 These activities render ISPs vulnerable to liability under copyright
law for primary or secondary infringement of copyright. 147 The Canadian
Copyright Act does not have a comprehensive treatment of ISPs liability,
although the Supreme Court of Canada has held that the provision
exempting passive conduits from infringement of the rights holder‘s right
to communicate to the public by telecommunication applies to certain
activities of ISPs. 148 In SOCAN, the Supreme Court concluded that ―the
Copyright Act, as a matter of legislative policy established by Parliament,
does not impose liability for infringement on intermediaries who supply
software and hardware to facilitate use of the Internet.‖ 149 The Supreme
Court found that ISPs benefit from the immunity provided by section
2.4(1)(b)150 when they purely act as a ―conduit‖ for communication to the
142

ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4, art.3 bis.
ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4, art. 3.ter.
144
ACTA July Draft, supra note X ch.2, s.4, art.3 quarter.
145
Gwen Hinze,Preliminary Analysis of the Officially Released ACTA Text(Apr.22,
2010), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/eff-analysis-officially-released-acta-text.
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Copyright Act, supra note X, s.3.(1).
147
Copyright Act, supra note X, s. 27. (1)(2)., see also, Andrew Bernstein & Rima
Ramchandani, Don’t Shoot the Messenger! A Discussion of ISP Liability, 1 CJLT 77, at
p.82(2002); SHERYL N. HAMILTON, Made in Canada: A Unique Approach to Internet
Service Provider Liability and Copyright Infringement, in IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST:
THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 285, 289 (Michael Geist ed., 2005).
148
Consultation Paper on Digital Copyright Issues (Jun. 22, 2001),
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/crp-prda.nsf/vwapj/digital.pdf/$FILE/digital.pdf, at p. 30.
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SOCAN, supra note X at para.101.
150
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public and do not ―engage in acts that relate to the content of the
communication.‖ 151 The Supreme Court added that section 2.4(1)(b) ―is
not a loophole but an important element of the balance struck by the
statutory copyright scheme.‖ 152 The Court held that ―a lack of actual
knowledge of the infringing contents, and the impracticality (both
technical and economic) of monitoring the vast amount of material moving
through the Internet, which is prodigious‖ are distinguishing qualities of
an ISP having the status of a ―conduit.‖ 153 To benefit from section
2.4(1)(b), the means which the ISP provides must be ―necessary‖: the
Supreme Court explained that ―[i]n context, the word ―necessary‖ in s.
2.4(1)(b) is satisfied if the means are reasonably useful and proper to
achieve the benefits of enhanced economy and efficiency.‖ 154 The
Supreme Court confirmed that only an ISP‘s function as an intermediary
or conduit is exempted from liability by means of section 2.4(1)(b). This
immunity ceases to exist when an ISP‘s activities ―cease to be content
neutral‖ and thus does not apply to non-intermediary roles by an ISP,
such as being content providers. 155
With respect to the issue of ―caching,‖ the Supreme Court held that
―[t]he creation of a ‗cache‘ copy, after all, is a serendipitous consequence
of improvements in Internet technology, is content neutral, and in light of
s. 2.4(1)(b) of the Act ought not to have any legal bearing on the
communication between the content provider and the end user.‖ 156 It
added, that ―‗[c]aching‘ is dictated by the need to deliver faster and more
economic service, and should not, when undertaken only for such
technical reasons, attract copyright liability.‖ 157
Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court hinted, in dictum, that ―notice of infringing content, and a
failure to respond by ―taking it down‖ may in some circumstances lead to
a finding of ―authorization,‖ which constitutes primary infringement. 158
The Supreme Court stated that a solution to this issue lies in legislation
that includes a ―notice and take down‖ system. 159 This suggestion does

communication of a work or other subject-matter to the public consists of providing the
means of telecommunication necessary for another person to so communicate the work or
other subject-matter does not communicate that work or other subject-matter to the public.‖
151
SOCAN, supra note X at para.92.
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SOCAN, supra note X at para.89.
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not reflect the practice that ISs are engaged with respect to allegations of
copyright infringement by their subscribers. Outside courts, ISPs are
voluntarily committed to a ―notice and notice‖ system to deter copyright
infringements through the services of ISPs. Under this systems right
holders can send a notice to the ISP complaining that specific ISP‘s
subscribers are infringing upon their copyrights. 160 Consequently, the ISP
forwards this notice to the relevant subscribers advising them that they are
abusing the ISP‘s services by engaging in allegedly copyright infringing
activities. 161 The ISP would inform the subscribers with the details of the
rights holders‘ allegations, and advice them to contact the complaining
right holders. 162 Finally, the ISP would send a notice to the right holders
indicating that the ISP has passed their notice to the relevant subscriber. 163
The role of the ISP ends here; if the relevant subscriber does not comply
with the notice and refrain from infringing copyright, rights holders
would need to their options against the alleged infringers through the
available means under the copyright law. 164 This system has been proved
effective in that ISPs notice a noticeable amount of alleged infringing
content is removed voluntarily by the customers receiving these notices. 165
According to the former President of the Canadian Association of Internet
Providers, Jay Thomson, the ―notice and notice‖ this system to is already
―highly successful[], resolving 80-90% of the infringement complaints
received.‖ 166
With ACTA safe harbor provisions in mind, a look to ISP immunity
under section s. 2.4(1)(b), under SOCAN, and under the voluntary ―notice
and notice‖ system leads to the following conclusions. First, Canada will
need to codify its law with respect to liability of ISPs in order to comply
with the requirements of ACTA. Second, while practically Canadian law
provides ISPs with a safe harbor with respect to their caching and hosting
activities as well as their roles as ―channels‖ or ―conduits,‖ which are
essentially the exceptions that ACTA requires member states to grant ISPs
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to be immune against copyright liability, ACTA may require Canada to
abandon its unique ―notice and notice‖ system, and legislatively adopt a
―notice and take-down‖ system.
Since Canada aims at reforming the ISP liability system in Phase 3 of
its copyright reform process and includes such provisions in Bill C-32, it
is interesting to see whether the provisions on ISP liability in this Bill will
be compliant with the provisions of ACTA. Bill C-32 proposes
amendments to clarify ISP liability. It exempts ISPs when they are acting
as pure ―intermediaries‖ with respect to their communication, 167 when
they practice caching for technical reasons, 168 and when they host
content. 169 Further, Bill C-32 would codify the Canadian ―notice and
notice‖ system to deal with online infringement activities. 170 While an ISP
is not required to remove allegedly infringing content, it is required to
retain the relevant subscriber‘s information for six months or for a year if
the matter is litigated. 171 It is clear that Bill C-32 would comply with
ACTA with respect to its ISPs safe harbor provisions; however, its system
of ―notice and notice‖ would conflict with the ACTA.
3. The Protection of Technological Protection Measures
ACTA would require member states to provide legal protection to
technological protection measures (TPMs) and rights management
information (RMI). The inclusion of this obligation in ACTA is
unjustified given the presence of another international legal framework for
the protection of TPMs and RMI in the WIPO Copyright Treaty172 and
WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty173 (WIPO Internet Treaties).
Furthermore, protecting TPMs and RMI does not comply with the
claimed purpose of ACTA as an enforceability treaty, as these provisions
are considered to be another layer of copyright protection: differently
put, they create new substantive rights.
The section in the official draft received more refinement in July draft.
Accordingly, the ACTA July draft prohibits the circumvention of an
access control TPM, but it does not mandate the prohibition of
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circumventing copy control TPM.
Nevertheless, it prohibits trafficking
in all TPMs‘ circumvention-enabling tools. 175 Unlike, the official draft,
the July draft does not specify that criminal remedies would be available
against individuals circumventing TPMs or RMI.
The treaty would allow member states to provide exceptions to the
provisions prohibiting the circumvention of TPMs or rights information
management, provided that these exceptions would not impair the legal
protection provided to TPMs or the remedies available against their
circumvention. 176 However, the circumvention of TPMs is prohibited
even if access is sought for a purpose allowed under the law. Japan is of
the opinion that the anti-circumvention prohibition applies ―without
prejudice to the rights, limitations, exceptions, or defence to copyright or
related rights infringement.‖ 177
Canada has a long story with the protection of TPMs. In 1996,
Canada signed both the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT)178 and the WIPO
Performance and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). 179 These two treaties
include provisions that would, inter alia, oblige member states to ―provide
adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the
circumvention of‖ TPMs and RMI. 180 Canada has not ratified these
treaties yet; thus, the Canadian Copyright Act remains without anticircumvention provisions. The Canadian Government‘s task to amend the
Copyright Act to accommodate the provisions of the WIPO Internet
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Treaties has proven difficult. Two attempts for reform failed: the first
was the 2005 Bill C-60 and the second was the 2008 Bill C-61. In June
2010, the Canadian Government took another attempt, the success of
which is still to be seen, by tabling Bill C-32 to amend the copyright to
give effect to the WIPO internet treaties and modernize the Copyright Act
in light of internet ―challenges and opportunities.‖ 181 While Bill C-32
includes anti-circumvention provisions that are supposed to bring Canada
into compliance with its obligations under the WIPO Internet Treaties, the
country‘s engagement in ACTA, where anti-circumvention rules are being
negotiated, adds the question of whether or not the proposed Bill would
satisfy the requirements of protecting TPMs and RMI under the ACTA.
Bill C-32 regulates the protection of technological protection measures
which would add new sections 41 et seq to the Copyright Act. The
section starts by defining ―technological protection measure‖ as ―any
effective technology, device or component that, in the ordinary course of
its operation, (a) controls access to a work, to a performer‘s performance
fixed in a sound recording or to a sound recording and whose use is
authorized by the copyright owner; or (b) restricts the doing—with respect
to a work, to a performer‘s performance fixed in a sound recording or to
a sound recording—of any act referred to in section 3, 15 or 18 and any
act for which remuneration is payable under section 19.‖ This definition
categorizes a TPM according to the purpose it serves in a copyrighted
work or protected subject matter as an ―access control TPM‖ that
prevents unauthorised access to the work or subject matter and a ―copy
control TPM‖ which limits certain uses of the copyrighted work or
subject matter. The scope of the technological mechanisms that fall under
the definition of ―circumvention‖ varies according to whether
circumvention is directed against a copy-control TPM or an access-control
TPM. Accordingly, circumvention of a copy-control TPM is ―to avoid,
bypass, remove, deactivate or impair the [TPM],‖ whereas the
circumvention of an access-control TPM includes in addition to that list of
prohibited activities ―descrambling a scrambled or decrypting an
encrypted work.‖ The definition of a TPM in Bill C-32 is similar to the
definition of a TPM under the provisions of ACTA; it includes both
access-control and copy-control TPMs. 182
Bill C-32 prohibits the circumvention of an access-control TPM, not a
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copy-control TPM.
This justifies the earlier distinction in definition
between an access-control TPM and a copy–control TPM. Similarly,
ACTA obliges member states to outlaw the circumvention of accesscontrol TPMs, but leaves it optional to these countries to prohibit copycontrol TPMs. This is the view of EU, Japan, Switzerland, Singapore,
Morocco, and Australia. 184 On the other hand, the U.S continues to
advocate for extending the prohibition against circumvention to protect
both types of TPMs. 185 Both Bill C-32 and ACTA prohibit trafficking in
circumvention tools targeting both types of TPMs; however, the scope of
the acts that qualify as trafficking under Bill C-32 is wider than its
counterpart under ACTA. The bill prohibits offering or providing
services to the public in three cases: if these services are mainly targeting
circumventing TPMs, if they are marketed as such, or if they have no
commercial value other than when used for purposes of TPMs‘
circumvention. 186
The prohibition extends to cover dealing with
circumvention technologies, tools and components by means of
manufacturing, importing, distributing, providing, offering for sale or
renting, selling or renting in three cases: when the technology, device, or
component is mainly made for the purpose of circumventing TPMs, if it is
marketed as such, or if it has no significant value but for the purpose of
circumventing TPMs. 187 In contrast, the prohibited trafficking acts under
ACTA are: manufacturing, importation, distribution, and (maybe offering
to distribute), 188 ―a device that has predominant function of circumventing
an effective technological measure and that is . . . marketed for the
purpose of circumventing an effective technological measure; primarily
designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing an effective
technological measure; or has only a limited commercially significant
purpose other than circumventing an effective technological measure.‖ 189
In other words, even if distribution under ACTA is understood as
enclosing ―renting and selling,‖ Bill C-32 provides additionally prohibits
―offering or providing services‖ of circumvention to the public. 190 More
importantly, the terminology used to refer to circumvention tools the
trafficking in which is prohibited under Bill C-32 is more inclusive than
183
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the terminology used in ACTA. Bill C-32 prohibits trafficking in
circumvention technologies, devices, or components, while ACTA
prohibits trafficking in circumvention devices (the U.S is proposing to
include a circumvention product). 191
Under Bill C-32 three categories of copyright subject matter are
protected: copyrighted works, a performer‘s performance fixed in a sound
recording, or a sound recording. ACTA is the same: it protects TPMs
integrated into the works of ―authors, and performers and producers of
phonograms.‖ 192
Bill C-32 has a bundle of exceptions pertinent to circumvention or
trafficking in its enabling tools. These exceptions are solely for the
purposes of facilitating law enforcement investigations and the protection
of national security; 193 making computer programs interoperable; 194 doing
encryption research; verifying and preventing the unauthorised collection
of personal information; 195 testing the reliability of the security of a
computer, computer system, or computer network and fixing their
flaws; 196 making the work perceptible to the person with a perceptual
disability; 197 gaining access to a telecommunications service through the
radio198 and making an ephemeral recording of protected work or subject
matter in a broadcasting undertaking. 199 These exceptions are not
absolute. The Bill provides that in some instances exceptions are not
applicable: namely, when they involve acts that may constitute copyright
infringement or violation of any federal or provincial law, 200 when they
render the TPM ―unduly impair[ed],‖ 201 when they are done without the
permission of the owner of the work or without the consent of the owner
or administrator of the computer system, 202 or when the individual
benefiting from the exception has obtained the TPM-protected subject
matter unlawfully. 203 The exceptions to the circumvention of TPMs and
trafficking in its enabling services and tools, taken with their constraints,
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would not raise any noncompliance concerns with ACTA‘s anticircumvention provisions. ACTA would allow member states to provide
exceptions to the provisions prohibiting the circumvention of TPMs or
rights information management, provided that ―they do not significantly
impair the adequacy of legal protection of those [technological (according
to Canadian proposal)] measures or the effectiveness of legal remedies for
violations of those measures.‖ 204
The exceptions provided in Bill C-32, nevertheless do not extend to
allow the circumvention of TPMs for purposes otherwise allowed by
Canadian copyright law, such as the right of fair dealing or private use.
The question is whether an exception for a purpose like fair dealing would
be compliant with ACTA. As a general rule, ACTA requires that
circumvention be prohibited independent of copyright infringement.
ACTA, however, allows exceptions provided that ―they do not
significantly impair the adequacy of legal protection‖ provided to TPMs.
Hence the fact that fair dealing is not infringement would not save an
exception allowing the circumvention for fair dealing purposes since the
treaty specifically provides that it is not a requirement for the prohibition
to apply that circumvention result in copyright infringement.
With respect to remedies, Bill C-32 provides both civil and criminal
remedies against individuals involved in the prohibited circumvention
activities. Specifically, a rights holder is entitled to all remedies available
under the law for copyright infringement against an individual who
circumvents an access-control TPM, 205 but cannot claim statutory damages
against an individual circumventing an access-control TPM for personal
use. 206 Nevertheless, all remedies, including statutory damages, are
available against individuals trafficking in anti-circumvention enabling
tools or services. 207 The court may reduce the damages awarded against
innocent infringers, who satisfy the court that they were unaware or did
not have reasonable grounds to know that their acts were prohibited by
this section. 208 Where the defendant is a library, archive, or a museum
and convinces the court that it did not know or had no reasonable grounds
to know that its activities are infringing, the only remedy available for the
plaintiff is injunction. 209 Individuals acting on behalf of these institutions
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are not subject to the criminal liability described in the Bill.
Bill C-32
subjects persons intentionally circumventing TPMs for commercial
purposes to criminal penalties that may reach up to $ 1 million and/or
imprisonment for five years. 211
While the official draft of ACTA included wording proposing the
establishment of both civil and criminal liability against circumventionbased prohibitions, the July draft no longer has this wording. The latter
merely obliges member countries to provide ―effective legal remedies‖ or
―adequate legal protection,‖ which means that Bill C-32 goes beyond the
requirements of the ACTA.
The Bill also prohibits intentionally altering or removing ―rights
management information,‖ 212 without the consent of the owner of the
copyright in the work, if the person knew or should have known that the
removal or alteration would facilitate or conceal copyright infringement or
harm the right to equitable remuneration for public performance and
communication to the public under section 19. 213 The Bill makes liable
anyone who knowingly and without the owner‘s consent distributes the
work of which the rights management information has been removed or
altered, sells, rents, or imports it into Canada for these purposes, or
communicates it to the public by telecommunication. Similarly, ACTA
prohibits the circumvention of rights management information and
prohibits the circulation of works of which the rights management
information has been removed.
It is important to note that if Bill C-32 fails to pass, Canada would
expose itself to more pressure as a country not complying with its
international intellectual property obligations.
IV.

CONCLUSION

With the advent of ACTA, the snowball of the protection and
enforceability of intellectual property rights will continue growing.
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Canadians, like other citizens whose countries may adhere to this treaty,
would notice major changes to the legal systems regulating their rights
and obligations with respect to intellectual property. With respect to
copyright law, by deciding to be a party of ACTA, Canada would be
facing a true challenge of fulfilling its international obligations and at the
same time preserving its carefully drawn copyright law and policy. This
task, in light of the content of ACTA, is significant.
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